This paper evaluates the relations between industrial activity and the structure of financial systems, corporate sectors and legal arrangements in different countries. Using data from 20 OECD countries in 27 industries over the period 1970 to 1995, we evaluate whether there is a link between industry activity and a combination of country structures and industry characteristics. We find significant interrelations between the two both in terms of industry growth rates and investment shares. The relations are sensitive to countries' stages of economic development: for example, the link between concentration of ownership and economic activity is of opposite sign in low and high income countries. There is strong evidence that the relations between financial structure and economic activity come through expenditures on R&D rather than fixed capital formation.
A Non-Technical Summary
There has been much discussion over a long period of time about the relationship between financial systems and economic performance. The relative performance of bank and stock market oriented financial systems has been discussed for the best part of a century and the problems associated with corporations being widely held by a large number of dispersed shareholders has been debated since the 1930's. More recently, attention has turned to the role of different legal and regulatory structures in promoting economic growth.
Despite the length and intensity of the debates, we still know very little about the way in which financial, corporate and legal structures bear on economic performance. There have been several studies that have looked at and found strong relations between financial and economic development. But they are open to a number of criticisms. Firstly, since they are concerned with growth at the national level, they suffer from small numbers of observations. Secondly, they can only provide limited control for the range of other factors, such as savings rates and non-financial endowments, which may influence economic performance. Thirdly, they have been restricted to assessments of whether there is a link between financial and economic development. They do not therefore address the range of other questions that lie at the heart of debates about financial systems.
A central issue is whether stock markets or banks are more appropriate for promoting economic development and, more subtly, whether different types of financial systems promote different types of activity. For example, it has been suggested that stock markets might be better at supporting new, risky activities (in, for example, high technology industries) where individuals legitimately hold diverse views about future prospects and stock markets perform a valuable function in aggregating these views. On the other hand, the monitoring of more routine activities, for example, investment in plant and machinery may be better delegated to a financial institution which can reduce costs of monitoring. Similarly, corporate sectors with concentrated ownership may overcome free rider problems of corporate control in some industries but exacerbate problems of private benefits of control in others.
While existing studies have focused on aggregate effects of financial development on economic performance, this paper examines the relationship of the structure of countries' financial systems, corporate sectors and legal systems to levels of activity in individual industries. We exploit the emergence of a new class of statistics that provides measures of the structure of financial, corporate and legal systems in a large number of countries. These have opened up the possibility of, for the first time, undertaking serious analysis of the relation between finance, corporate and legal governance and economic performance.
We map these large data banks on country structures to the characteristics of a wide variety of manufacturing industries in an attempt to establish whether there is an interrelation between the two. Specifically, we are interested in whether country structures (financial, corporate and legal forms) and characteristics of industries (dependence on external finance and investments in skills and training) are related to levels of activity (growth rates and levels of investment) of these industries in different countries. For example, do bank oriented financial systems promote the growth of bank dependent industries? Do ownership concentrations encourage investment in skill intensive industries? Are stock market oriented countries associated with investments in R&D?
We perform this analysis by collecting data on growth, fixed capital formation and expenditures on R&D in 27 manufacturing industries in 20 OECD countries over 25 years from 1970 to 1995. We collect data on country structures and industry characteristics. There are three types of country structure variables. The first is measures of the size of stock markets, banking systems and ownership concentration. The second is information disclosure (accounting standards), bank relations (as measured by bank ownership of corporate equity) and the nature of concentrated ownership (specifically pyramid structures). The third is indicators of legal formcreditor rights, anti-director rights and the origins of legal systems (civil versus common law systems).
The industry characteristics are the extent to which industries are dependent on bank finance, equity finance and investment in skills. This requires an assessment of the countries in which institutional arrangements are most conducive to their provision. We measure the reliance of different industries on bank finance in Japan, market finance in the US, and skills in Germany.
All the variables are demeaned relative to industry and/or country means. The equations therefore estimate the relation of three measures of activity (growth, share of fixed capital formation in value added and share of R&D in value added) to the interaction of the country and industry variables controlling for both country and industry specific effects. We find that there is a strong relation of the country-industry inter-relations to two of three measures of activity -growth and R&D -but only a weak relation to the third -fixed capital formation. In addition, the relations of growth and R&D to the country-industry inter-actions are very similar. This suggests that (a) the financial and corporate structures of countries bear more directly on R&D activity than on fixed capital formation and (b) their influence on growth comes via R&D rather capital formation, at least in OECD countries.
There is evidence of a relationship between market features (in particular disclosure of information) and activities in market financed industries. However, there is no support for the view that activities in bank financed industries are positively related to the bank orientation of a country's financial system; indeed, if anything, the performance of these industries is more closely associated with information disclosure. In addition, there is no relation of concentration of ownership to growth or investment in industries with high skill or high financing requirements.
We perform several tests of robustness of these results. In addition, we are concerned with the endogeneity of the independent variables -the possibility that activities may cause rather than be caused by country structures and industry characteristics. It is, for example, frequently suggested that financial development is derivative in a Coasian sense that financial institutions emerge to meet economic requirements rather than determine economic performance. For the most part, the results are quite robust to different specifications; however, there is one respect in which they are sensitive. We split the sample into two groups -countries that had high GDP per capita at the start of the period and those that had low GDP per capita. The idea was to examine (a) the Gerschenkron thesis that banks play a particularly important role in the early stages of development of a country and (b) the view that the agency problems associated with high concentration of ownership are particularly acute in less developed economic systems.
We find support for both these views. Whereas there is no clear association of banking and ownership structures with economic activity in the sample as a whole, there is in the two sub-samples. In particular, there is a positive relation in the less developed countries between activity in bank financed industries and the bank orientation of the countries and a negative relation between concentration of ownership and activity in high skill and external financed industries. In more developed countries, the relations are precisely reversed.
The conclusion of the article is that financial, corporate and legal structures do bear an important relation to industrial characteristics, that their effects on activity come primarily through R&D rather than fixed capital formation and that the relations are sensitive to different stages of economic development.
Introduction
Over the last decade, several studies have documented significant differences in the organization of financial markets and corporate sectors across countries. These differences relate in particular to the structure of financial systems and the role of banks, the ownership and control of corporations, and financial regulation and corporate law.
Comparative studies of financial systems have a long history. In 1910, L. Joseph asserted that the funding of industry by banks in Britain compared unfavourably with that in the US and Continental Europe. The role of French, German and Italian banks in promoting industrial growth at the end of the last century has been emphasized in particular by Cameron (1961 and 1967) and Gerschenkron (1962) . The involvement of banks in the post WWII Japanese economy has been documented inter alia by Scharfstein (1990, 1991) and Miyajima (1995) .
These studies point to the close connections that exist between banks and industry in Germany and Japan. In Germany, these relations include bank ownership of corporate equity, positions on the supervisory board of firms and proxy voting on behalf of individual investors; in Japan, they are associated with exchange of personnel, bank ownership of corporate equity, provision of rescue finance and the holding of compensating balances. These bank-firm links are viewed as encouraging the provision of more bank finance, particularly during periods of financial distress, on better terms than exist elsewhere.
But these assertions have not gone unchallenged. Edwards and Fischer (1994) and Edwards and Ogilvie (1996) note that banks have provided less finance for industry in Germany than in the UK and German banks have only been able to exert modest control through proxy votes and supervisory board positions. Edwards and Nibler (1998) find that there is no positive effect of bank ownership of equity on the profitability of large German firms. In Japan, Kang and Stulz (1997) record that bank dependent firms were more seriously affected by the stock market declines of 1990 to 1993, suffering larger wealth losses and investing less than other firms. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) record that close bank-firm ties increase availability of capital to Japanese firms but do not lead to higher profitability or growth because of the market power that banks can exert.
More recently attention has focused on differences in ownership and control (Becht (1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998) ). In the UK and the US, a high proportion of the largest companies are listed on stock markets and have ownership dispersed amongst a large number of institutional and individual investors.
On the Continent in Europe, most companies are private and ownership of listed companies is highly concentrated. Ownership is frequently in the hands of families; corporate holdings in the form of pyramids are commonplace; there are crossshareholdings and complex webs of corporate shareholdings; and in some countries, there is significant bank ownership of shares.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have documented the significant differences that exist in corporate law and regulation across countries. They distinguish between countries having common law systems as exist, for example, in the UK and US, and civil law, for example, the French system. These systems are associated with different degrees of protection of minority shareholders, creditors versus debtors and directors versus investors. The differences are in turn associated with the development and depth of financial markets. In particular, minority protection is greater and financial markets better developed under common than civil law systems.
Despite the considerable volume of research on international variations in financial markets, we still know very little about the impact of these differences on the performance of firms and economies. There have been several studies pointing to the importance of financial systems in economic development. King and Levine (1993) have documented a relation between the size of financial sectors, as measured for example, by the ratio of monetary assets to GDP and the growth of economies. Levine and Zervos (1998) report that both stock market liquidity and banking sector development (measured by bank credit to GDP ratios) are correlated with economic growth, capital accumulation and productivity growth. However, such studies encounter two types of problems. Firstly, sample sizes are restricted to the small number of countries for which data are available. Secondly, it is very hard to control for the numerous other factors that might be contributing to international differences in growth rates. In particular, attempts to obtain reasonable sample sizes mean that countries with different characteristics and at different stages of their development have to be compared. Rajan and Zingales (1998) attempt to overcome this problem by comparing growth rates of different industries across countries. This has the advantage that sample sizes are much larger and, since growth rates relative to industry and country averages are being measured, there are good controls for other factors that might influence comparative growth rates. Rajan and Zingales report an interrelation between industry growth rates and the product of a measure of the dependence on external finance of different industries (measured in the US) and the development of different countries' financial systems (in particular, as measured by the number of accounting standards).
Industries dependent on external finance (in the US) grow faster in other countries that have a highly developed financial system as measured by accounting standards. They argue that this points to an impact of financial development on economic growth.
Financial development relaxes constraints on the expansion of industries dependent on external finance and thereby raises aggregate economic growth.
There is an alternative view suggested by the debates summarized above, and that is that different financial systems might be suited to different types of activities and different stages of development of firms and economies. Gerschenkron (1962) argues that the initial stages of economic development can be promoted by banking systems and controlled capital markets. Subsequent economic progress may benefit from more liberal securities markets. Allen (1993) argues that banks may overcome free rider problems of monitoring but that stock markets might be better at aggregating diverse views about new technologies. This suggests that bank oriented systems may be better suited to traditional manufacturing industries and stock market economies to the promotion of high technology industries.
Similarly, the literature has pointed to a trade-off between the benefits of having concentrated or dispersed shareholdings. Concentrated ownership overcomes free rider problems of corporate control (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ) and markets in partial share blocks may be more efficient than full tender offers (Grossman and Hart (1980) and Burkhart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998) ). However, they create private benefits of control problems (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and takeover markets may be more efficient at correcting managerial failure (Scharfstein (1988) ). Banks may therefore be beneficial in the early stages of development and banks and concentrated ownership in industries in which close monitoring and control are required. Stock markets and dispersed ownership may be preferred in more mature economies or in industries in which there is considerable technological uncertainty. This paper is concerned with the interrelation between the financial and legal structure of economies, the characteristics of industries and the activities of different industries in different countries. In particular, it addresses the question of whether there is a matching between different financial systems with different types of corporate activities or whether the two are unrelated. We examine this by evaluating how different country structures (financial, corporate and legal systems) interact with different industry characteristics (such as external financing and skill requirements) to influence activities in particular industries in particular countries.
The level of activity in an industry is evaluated in relation to its growth rate over a 25 year period from 1970 to 1995 and by shares of investment (as a fraction of value added) in fixed capital formation and R&D. These are measured relative to world averages for their industries and relative to averages in their countries. We therefore introduce the controls described in the Rajan and Zingales paper into an evaluation of the comparative financial systems, comparative corporate governance and comparative legal systems debates. Section 2 of the paper describes the hypotheses that the paper tests and the methodology that it employs. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the results of the regression analyses for the determinants of growth, capital expenditure and R&D. Section 5 summarizes the implications of the results for hypotheses described in section 2 and section 6 concludes the article.
2
Theory and Methodology
Theory
This paper is concerned with the interrelationship between the structure of countries corporate and financial systems, the characteristics of different industries and activities of industries in different countries. Examples of country structure that are used in this paper are the size of the banking sector, the size of securities markets, and the degree of concentration of ownership. Examples of industry characteristics are the extent to which industries are reliant on external financing from banks and equity markets and the skill level of workers in different industries. Activity levels are measured by growth rates and shares of value added devoted to fixed capital formation and R&D expenditure in different industries in different countries.
The first hypothesis considers whether there is an interrelation between financial and corporate systems, characteristics of industries and economic activity. Rejection of hypothesis 3 does not rule out different financial systems having different effects on economic activity: it is, for example, quite consistent with stock markets having a stronger or weaker relation to economic activity than banks. However, rejection of hypothesis 3 is not consistent with stock markets having a systematically different relation from banks to activity in industries with particular characteristics.
The fourth hypothesis examines the influence of concentration of ownership.
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) However, there is a counter-argument that ownership concentrations exacerbate conflicts between private and public benefits of control and between minority and majority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ). This suggests that there may be no relationship along the lines described in hypothesis 4 or that it might even be of the opposite sign. This is most likely to be the case in countries in their initial stages of development where systems of financial and corporate control are less well developed.
In the absence of well developed institutional arrangements, Gerschenkron attributes a particularly important role to banks in the early stages of development.
Hypothesis 5: Industries that are heavily dependent on external finance and investment in skills display higher growth and investment shares in developing
countries with well developed banking systems and low levels of concentration of ownership.
Methodology
We define: 
We therefore construct the demeaned dependent variables, demeaned relative to both country and industry averages, and demeaned industry and country variables, demeaned relative to their all industry and worldwide averages respectively. We The advantage of the demeaning approach is that it allows attention to be focused on the relationship between growth (or investment) and the interaction of country structure and industry characteristics. While problems of omitted variables can never be eliminated entirely, by demeaning data relative to country and industry averages we are able to provide a control for other factors that may affect growth and investment. There are a number of issues that this estimation raises. We have already mentioned the problem of omitted variables. We attempt to overcome this by examining the influence of a range of variables in addition to those referred to above on performance.
However, there are obvious limitations to such an exercise.
Secondly, it is questionable whether the country structure and industry characteristic variables can be really treated as exogenous. The structure of countries and the characteristics of industries may be a product of rather than a cause of the performance of different industries and countries. For example, whether a country has high levels of concentration of ownership may reflect rather than cause the growth rates of its industries.
There are two senses in which this may be troublesome. Firstly, in interpreting the results there is a strong temptation to impute causation to, in particular, the country structures, for example, to suggest that growth in industry i in country k was above or below average because of a high or low level of bank ownership or information disclosure. We wish to make clear that we are not attempting to infer such causation.
Whether a structural feature caused or was caused by activity in an industry in a country is highly debatable. The hypothesis that we are testing is the more basic one that there is an interrelation between country structures, industry characteristics and activity in industries in particular countries.
However, this interpretation does not avoid the econometric problems that endogeneity creates. We use a number of techniques to address this. Firstly, it has been argued by La Porta et al (1997) that legal factors (such as creditor and shareholder rights and the origins of legal systems) are more fundamental than some of the country structural variables described above. We exploit this assertion in two ways: firstly by replacing some of the country characteristics with legal factors and, secondly, by instrumenting our country structure variables with legal factors. In particular, the claim of exogeneity seems to be most convincing in the case of the origin of legal systems, which is used as an instrument for the country structural variables.
Secondly, as is discussed in the next section, data from three countries (Germany, Japan and the US) are used to identify the three industry structure variables. Problems of endogeneity are likely to be most acute in relation to these three countries in so far as feedback from performance to structure is most likely to come from performance in those countries. We therefore report below the results of omitting these three countries from the analysis.
Data

Output and growth
Data were collected on growth in constant price value added in 27, predominantly 3-digit SIC, manufacturing industries in 20 OECD countries over the period 1970 to 1995. The data came from OECD DSTI (STAN) 1997.
1 Table 1 records the annual average growth rates of the 20 OECD countries over the period 1970 to 1995. South Korea has an appreciably higher growth rate than other 1 See the data appendix. An alternative source of data is the Industrial Statistics Yearbook of the United Nations Statistical Division. The country coverage of the UN data is greater than that of the OECD. However, the control problems of the regressions are probably exacerbated by the inclusion of developing as well as developed countries and a comparison of the two sources suggested that there were fewer statistical problems with the OECD data. In particular, there is no constant price value added series in the UN data.
countries. Portugal has the next highest growth rate. The table decomposes deviations of country growth rates from world averages into three components. The first is a "share effect", the contribution of deviations of initial shares in different industries from world averages in 1980, assuming that industries grow at the world average over the period. The second is a "growth effect", the contribution of deviations from world average growth rates assuming initial shares are equal to world averages. The third is an "interactive effect", the interaction of deviations of initial shares and industry growth rates from world averages. The first captures the extent to which deviations from world average growth rates are attributable to high initial shares in industries that experienced high or low growth globally; the second records country specific deviations from world average growth rates independent of initial industry allocations; and the third captures interactions between initial shares and country specific growth rates.
The table records that the country variation is nearly entirely attributable to the growth effect. This is confirmed by an analysis of variance: -8.0% of country growth variation is attributable to the share effect, 131.6% to the growth effect and -23.8% to the interactive effect; the last of these implies that there is significant regression to the mean -high share industries have below average growth rates.
Fixed capital formation and R&D
Data were collected on gross fixed capital formation for 27 manufacturing industries in 20 OECD countries over the period 1970 to 1990 and on R&D expenditure for 15 manufacturing industries in 14 OECD countries over the period 1973 to 1994. 2 Table   2 reports the average ratio of fixed capital formation to value added in manufacturing over the period 1970 to 1990 in 20 OECD countries and the average ratio of R&D to value added over the period 1973 to 1994 in 14 OECD countries. The rankings of the two are markedly different. While Spain has the lowest ratio of both, the UK and USA have some of the highest R&D ratios but the lowest fixed capital formation ratios.
Tables 3 presents disaggregated data for growth, fixed capital formation and R&D to value added ratios for all OECD countries and for Germany, Japan, UK and US. It records the three industries with the highest growth and shares in the OECD as a whole and in the four countries individually. The rankings of the highest growth, highest fixed capital formation share and highest R&D share industries is quite 2 The time periods and industries were dictated by data availability from the OECD. In addition, different, across the OECD as a whole and within individual countries. There is considerable cross-country variation in relative industry performance. Only one of the three fastest growing industries in Japan (electrical machinery, professional goods and motor vehicles) was amongst the three fastest growing industries in the OECD as a whole (electrical machinery, other chemicals and plastic products). The fastest growing industry in Japan (electrical machinery) grew at nearly twice the rate of the fastest growing industry in the US (plastic products) which in turn grew considerably faster than the fastest growing industries in Germany and the UK. The fixed capital formation share of the highest capital expenditure industry in Japan (petrol and coal products) was more than twice that of the highest capital expenditure industry in any of Germany, the UK and US. On the other hand, the R&D share of the highest R&D industry in the US was much greater than that of the highest R&D industry in Germany and Japan. This suggests that there is considerable variation in the nature of both industry growth and investment activity across countries.
Industry characteristics
We focus on three characteristics of industries: the extent to which they are reliant on market sources of finance, bank finance and a skilled labour force. Establishing the significance of these inputs to the activities of different industries is complicated by the constraints under which firms in these industries may be operating. There may be legal, regulatory, institutional and cultural considerations which limit their availability or raise their price. The approach which we have taken mirrors that in Rajan and Zingales (1998) who argue that since the US has one of the most highly developed and liberal financial markets in the world, US firms are likely to face the least constraints in raising external finance. External funding levels of US industries will therefore most closely approximate the requirements of firms operating in those industries.
We similarly constructed our three industry variables by using the countries in which conventional wisdom suggests that they are least likely to be constrained and therefore a close reflection of the underlying characteristics. Stylized descriptions treat the US as the archetypal market based financial system, Japan as a bank based system and Germany as a country in which investments in skills and training is promoted. We therefore measured cross-industry variations in external market based sources of finance in the US, bank finance in Japan and investment in skills in Germany.
petrol refineries were excluded throughout because of price index number problems.
Using data from Rajan and Zingales (1998) , external financing was measured as the fraction of capital expenditure not financed with cash flow from operations by US firms during the 1980's. Equity financing was measured as the ratio of the net amount of equity issues to capital expenditures. Industry data on bank finance in Japan was obtained from the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Bank financing ratios were constructed as the ratio of bank loans to gross external financing (total investment including investment in financial assets minus retentions) and as the ratio of bank loans to physical investment (net of depreciation) averaged over the period 1981 to 1990.
Most of the results reported below refer to the latter definition of bank financing. Oulton (1996) Table 4 shows three of the industry variables: equity financing, bank financing and skill levels. Electrical machinery has a high level of equity financing in the US but a modest level of bank financing in Japan. Clothing has one of the highest levels of bank financing in Japan but raised no equity in the US. Skill levels are high in ship-building, an industry which raises little equity in the US and ran down outstanding stocks of bank debt during the 1980's. Skill levels are low in textiles, an industry which was heavily dependent on bank finance in Japan but raised little external equity finance in the US. In professional goods, levels of equity finance, bank finance and skills are all above their means. The correlation between equity and bank finance is 0.073, between skills and bank financing is -0.455 and between skills and equity financing is 0.172.
Country structures
Five structural features which apparently display considerable variation across countries are the degree of concentration of ownership, information disclosure rules, relations between banks and industry, the sizes of stock markets and banking systems.
In two papers, La Porta et al report data on ownership concentration in a large number of countries. La report data on the median ownership of the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest non-financial privately owned domestic firms. La Porta et al (1998, table 3b ) report the mean percentage of the 20 largest firms which were widely held in the sense of having no shareholder with more than 10% voting control. La Porta et al (1998, Table 6 reports the results of a regression of value added growth across 27 mainly 3-digit SIC industries in 20 OECD countries over the period 1970 to 1995. The independent variables are the initial shares of industries at the start of the period, nine interactive terms constructed from the three industry characteristics variables bank finance, equity finance and skills, and the three country structural variables accounting standards, bank credit to GDP ratios and concentration of ownership. All variables have been demeaned as described above. A dummy variable (which has not been reported) was also included to account for observations where bank finance in Japan was not available. The standard errors are all Huber-corrected.
Growth
Six variables are significant at better than the 10% level in the growth regression.
Initial shares are strongly negative implying regression to the mean in the sense that industries with high initial shares of total output in particular countries have below average growth (relative to the country in question and the world average for that industry). The size of the effect is large. A 1% increase in the initial share of an industry in a country is associated with 0.250% lower annual average growth rate of that industry.
Two of the three variables which interact with accounting standards are significant.
Greater disclosure is associated with faster growth in skill intensive and equity financed industries but with lower growth in industries that make little use of skilled labour and little equity financing. Again the economic significance of these variables is quite Separate regressions on the three sub-periods, 1970 to 1980, 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 1995, reveal that the interactive effect of accounting with skills is strongest in the early periods and with equity finance in the later periods. Interactive effects with size of banking systems are most in evidence in the 1980s. Table 6 also reports results of regressions with the same set of independent variables but with R&D and fixed capital formation (both as a ratios of value added) as dependent variables. Table 6 reveals similar results for R&D to those reported above for growth. There is a positive relation between accounting standards and growth rates in skill intensive and equity financed industries. In addition to a negative relation between the size of banking systems and R&D in bank financed industries, there is also a significant negative relation with accounting standards. These results are particularly strongly observed in the last sub-period between 1990 and 1994. Again the magnitude of the effects is large: shifting from the lowest to the highest accounting standard country is associated with a 0.470 × 0.090 = 4.2 percent increase in the ratio of R&D to value added in electrical machinery (the industry with a high equity dependence) through the equity finance interaction term. On the other hand, the same variation in accounting standards is associated with a 0.470 × 0.043 = 2.0 percent decline in the ratio of R&D to value added in food (an industry which raised no external equity finance in the US) through the same term.
R&D and fixed capital formation
While the 'determinants' of growth and R&D are similar, the 'determinants' of fixed capital formation are quite different. Accounting standards and concentration of ownership are associated with large ratios of fixed capital formation to value added in low equity industries. This is observed in both of the sub-periods.
Accounting standards do not therefore appear to promote growth through fixed capital formation but rather through R&D. In addition, while the interactive terms explain a substantial fraction of R&D to value added and value added growth (R 2 of 17.4% and 14.2% respectively), they explain very little of the cross industry/country variations in fixed capital formation (R 2 of 2.3%). The interaction of country structures and industry characteristics is therefore related to growth and R&D but not to fixed capital formation.
Alternative variable definitions
We have examined the robustness of the results to several different definitions of both country and industry variables.
Country structure variables
As There is no significant bank ownership variable in the fixed capital formation or R&D regressions.
Replacing accounting standards with the size of stock markets (as measured by the ratio of market capitalization to GDP ratios), the fixed capital formation equation is similar to that in table 6 with a significant negative term in the interaction of market capitalization and new equity finance. However, all the interactive terms in market capitalization are insignificant in the growth regression and only an interactive term with skills is positively significant at the 10% level in the R&D regression. This again points to the close relation of determinants of growth and R&D in OECD countries and the fact that accounting standards are more relevant than market capitalization to both. However, the interaction with accounting standards is only significant in the R&D regressions when skills in the higher levels are included. In fact, there is a striking increase in the significance of the term in the R&D regression as the skill variable is raised from lower to higher levels. R&D shares are therefore closely associated with the interaction of accounting standards with high skill levels.
Industry characteristic variables
To date, bank finance in Japan has been measured as the ratio of bank finance to net physical investment. Since retained earnings are the dominant source of finance in most industries, it might be thought more appropriate to measure bank finance in relation to external rather than total finance. Results in the R&D and investment In addition to the above, we ran robustness tests which weight observations by their absolute residuals and regresses them again using these weights. It continues to iterate in this way until the maximum change in weights falls below a certain tolerance. The results using these robust regressions were very similar to those reported in table 6.
To summarize, many of the results reported in table 6 
Exogeneity tests
The main issue raised by the above analysis is whether the independent variables can be treated as exogenous. The fact that they are not measured prior to the dates over which growth, fixed capital formation and R&D are measured exacerbates this concern. But even if they were then the question of whether country structures and industry characteristics could be treated as exogenous would arise.
La These results reinforce those of the previous section in suggesting that investor protection promotes growth in external finance-and skill-intensive industries through R&D expenditure. Creditor protection may also play a role in promoting capital expenditure in skill-intensive industries.
An alternative approach to the endogeneity problem is to instrument the variables used in the main regressions. The origin of the legal system is the one variable that could be genuinely argued to be exogenous. We instrumented all three country variables using the origin of the legal system interacted with the appropriate industry characteristic variable. Column 2 of table 8 reports that the results are similar to those of table 6 except that there is now more evidence of a significantly positive relationship of growth with the interaction of ownership concentration with equity finance and skills.
As a further test of exogeneity we omitted the three countries which were used to construct the industry characteristic variables: Germany, Japan and the US. While growth, fixed capital formation and R&D of these three countries might affect financing differences and skill levels in industries in these three countries, it is less plausible to argue that they are influenced by growth, fixed capital formation and R&D in other countries. Column 3 of table 8 reproduces the growth regression dropping Germany, Japan and the US. The main results reported above are invariant to omission of these three countries: there is still a strong positive relation of growth with the interaction of accounting standards and both equity finance and skills, a negative interaction of the size of banking systems with bank financing and a positive interaction with equity financing.
Stages of economic development
We have examined the relationship of the above results to stage of economic development by splitting the sample into countries which had low and high GDP per capita at the start of the period. 4 Five countries had GDP per capita in 1970 in the range $2,200 to $7,300: Greece, Korea, Mexico, Portugal and Spain. These are referred to as low GDP per capita countries. The remainder had GDP per capita in the range $9,100 to $15,000. Table 9 Nearly all of the variables are of opposite sign and most significantly so. The absence of significant coefficients on ownership concentration variables in column 2 of table 6 masks the fact that there are significant relations in both more and less developed countries but those relations are of opposite sign. In the high GDP per capita countries there is a positive relation with the interactive terms in concentration and both equity finance and skills, implying that high levels of concentration are associated with high growth in equity financed and skill-intensive industries. In the low GDP per capita countries these relations are significantly negative.
A notable feature of table 9 is the high degree of explanatory power associated with the equation for low GDP per capita countries in comparison with that for high GDP per countries. This is mirrored in a difference in explanatory power of the fixed capital formation equation between the two samples of countries: 2.1% in the high and 16.4%
in the low GDP per capita sample. In the high GDP per capita sample the only significant variable in the investment equation is the negative interactive term between ownership concentration and equity finance. In the low GDP per capita sample, there are significant positive interactive terms of both size of banking system and ownership concentration with bank finance. In sum, there is a strong relationship of financial systems with economic activity which differs by type of financial system, characteristics of industries and type of activity.
Market based systems are associated with growth of equity financed and skill-intensive activities. The effect comes through R&D rather than fixed capital formation and is particularly in evidence in high GDP per capita countries. Banking systems are associated with higher growth in bank dependent industries in low but not high GDP per capita countries. There is evidence that high levels of concentration of ownership overcome agency problems in certain types of industries in high GDP countries; but these same industries -equity dependent and skill-intensive ones -may be adversely affected by highly concentrated ownership in less developed countries where its detrimental effects are not adequately controlled.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to use information that is becoming available on differences in corporate and financial systems to examine their effect on industrial activity. We have used a different approach from the existing literature to examine the interaction of these country structures with industry characteristics on growth, fixed capital formation and R&D. We have argued that this provides both larger data sets and better controls than traditional international comparisons permit.
We were concerned with four sets of relations. The first came from bank-firm relations, which have received a great deal of prominence in the comparative systems literature. The second was the development of securities markets. The third was concentration of ownership where there are conflicting views as to whether this resolves or creates agency problems. The final relation was with legal systems, which it has recently been suggested, might be fundamental to the operation of financial systems and corporate sectors.
We find support for the second and fourth of these relations. There is a strong relation of market systems and legal protection of investors with growth of equity financed and skill-intensive industries. In our full sample, we find no evidence for a role of bankfirm relations, and if anything, evidence that supports the view that concentration of ownership exacerbates agency problems. But the most striking result concerns not the nature of these relations but their form. It might have been expected at the outset that it would be hardest to establish relations between country structure, industry characteristics and R&D expenditure and comparatively easy to find relations with fixed capital formation since the former are intangible and the latter tangible. In fact we find just the converse. We can explain a significant amount of cross industry and country variation in R&D expenditure and very little of fixed capital formation. Why is that?
Before we hazard an answer, we reiterate the caveats made above. There may be some obvious variables that have been omitted from the analysis that would render financial systems and corporate structures important in explaining capital expenditure.
Still more seriously, the nature of the analysis means that we cannot interpret the absence of a relation as meaning that country structures do not affect overall differences in investment across countries. Close relations between banks and industry may have significantly increased growth in countries with high bank ownership. We cannot reject that hypothesis. All we can say is that they do not appear to have promoted comparatively higher growth in bank financed industries.
But the results may also be telling us that the relations of industrial growth to financial and corporate systems are sensitive to stages of economic development. In high GDP per capita countries, growth is promoted through efficiently operating financial systems encouraging expenditure on R&D rather than fixed capital formation and through concentrations of ownership diminishing agency problems in high equity finance and skill-intensive industries. In contrast, in lower GDP per capita countries, banking systems are important in promoting bank financed industries and high levels of concentration of ownership can detrimentally affect the growth of skill-intensive and equity financed industries.
If these results are valid then they suggest that policies concerning the structure of financial and corporate systems should be sensitive to different stages of economic development. In the early stages of development, policy may be best focused on the establishment of efficient banking systems and the control of ownership concentrations but at later stages they should be directed towards market liberalization and the establishment of more effective forms of corporate control. In column 3 the difference between the country growth rate and the average of the 20 countries is shown, which in columns 4, 5 and 6 is decomposed into "share", "growth" and "interactive"effects. These are the first, second and third terms respectively of the right hand side of the equation:
where a ik is the share of industry i in country k's total manufacturing in 1970, g ik is the growth rate of industry i in country k over the period 1970 to 1995 and subscript -denotes the average across all countries. . Panel B in the table reports the average ratio of investment (gross domestic fixed capital formation) to value added in the three industries with the highest ratio in the 20 OECD countries and individually in the same four countries over the period . Panel C reports the average ratio of research and development to value added in the three industries with the highest ratio in 14 OECD countries and individually in the same four countriesover the period 1973-1994. In each case, the industry definitions are described in the data appendix. Source: OECD Structural Analysis Industrial (STAN Rajan and Zingales (1998) . Column 3 is the average proportion of net physical investment financed by bank loans in Japan over the period 1981 to 1990. The source of these data is the Japanese Ministry of Finance (n.a. = not available). Column 4 is one minus the proportion of employees reported by Oulton (1996) Table 5 : Country Variables Column 2 is the number of accounting standards on a scale from 0 to 90 reported in Rajan and Zingales (1998) from a survey conducted by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research normalized to lie in the range 0 to 1 by dividing by 90. Column 3 is the proportion of total equity market capitalization in different countries held by banks. No single source of data is available for this series. Where possible, it was collected directly from Central Banks as detailed in the data appendix, otherwise the source was OECD Financial Statistics (n.a. = not available). Column 4, shows 1 minus percentage of widely held of the 20 largest publicly traded firms in1995, reported in La Porta et al (1998 Table 6 Regression of Growth, Fixed Capital Formation and R&D on Interaction of Country Structure and Industry Characteristic Variables The table reports the results of regressions of annual average growth rates in column 2, of the share of fixed capital formation in value added in column 3 and of the share of research and development in value added in column 3. The country and industry pools are defined in the data appendix. There are ten demeaned independent variables: initial value added shares of industries at the start of the period (initial shares) and nine interactive terms between three country structure variables (bank credit/GDP ratios (credit), accounting standards (acc) and concentration of ownership (own)) and three industry characteristics (external bank finance in Japan (bank), proportion of workers with any skill training in Germany (allskill) and external equity finance in the US (equity)). A constant, and 0,1 dummy variables relating to industries and countries with missing independent variables have been included but are not reported below. Huber-corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, and *** = significant at 1% level.
Variables Growth 1970-1995 Fixed capital formation 1970-1990 Table 7 . Signs on Interactive Terms in Growth Regression Using Alternative Independent Variable Definitions This table reports the signs on the interactive terms of regressions on annual average growth rates over the period 1970 to 1995 using alternative variable definitions from those shown in table 6 for both country structure and industry characteristic variables. The outcomes of using different industry variables are shown in the rows, where each row R1 to R3 represents a separate equation in which an alternative industry variable has been used. The outcomes of using different country variables are shown in the columns, where each column C1 to C3 represents a separate equation in which an alternative country variable has been used. For ease of comparison, the results from table 6 are reproduced in the lower right hand quadrant of this table. The entries refer to the signs in the growth regressions. + = positive sign significant at 10% level, ++ = positive sign significant at 5% level, +++ = a positive sign significant at 1% level, -= negative sign significant at 10% level, --= negative sign significant at 5% level, ---= negative sign significant at 1% level, 0 = insignificant coefficient. Table 8 Exogeneity Tests on Growth Regression, 1970 to 1995 Column 2 reports the regression described in column 2 of table 6, using origins of legal systems as an instrumental variable for all the country structure variables. Column 3 reproduces column 2 of table 6 excluding the three countries used in the country structure variables (Germany, Japan and the USA). Huber-corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, and *** = significant at 1% level.
Variables
Instrumental 
